Computing accurate low rank approximations of large matrices is a fundamental data mining task. In many applications however the matrix contains sensitive information about individuals. In such case we would like to release a low rank approximation that satisfies a strong privacy guarantee such as differential privacy. Unfortunately, to date the best known algorithm for this task that satisfies differential privacy is based on naive input perturbation or randomized response: Each entry of the matrix is perturbed independently by a sufficiently large random noise variable, a low rank approximation is then computed on the resulting matrix.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a large m × n matrix A in which columns correspond to individuals, rows correspond to movies, and the non-zero entry in A(i, j) represent the rating that individual j has given to movie i. Such a data set shares two important characteristics with many other data sets:
1. It can be represented as a matrix with very different dimensions. There are many more people than movies, so n m 2. It is composed of sensitive information: the rating that an individual gives to a particular movie (and the very fact that he watched said movie) can be possibly compromising information.
Nevertheless, although we want to reveal little about the existence of individual ratings in this data set, it might be extremely useful to be able to allow data analysts to mine such a matrix for statistical information. Even while protecting the privacy of individual entries, it might still be possible to release another matrix that encodes a great deal of information about the original data set. For example, we might hope to be able to recover the cut structure of the corresponding rating graph, perform principal component analysis (PCA), or apply some other data mining technique. Indeed, this example is not merely theoretical. Data of exactly this form was released by Netflix as part of their competition to design improved recommender systems. Spectral methods such as PCA were commonly used on this dataset, and privacy concerns were acknowledged: Netflix attempted to "anonymize" the dataset in an ad-hoc way. Following this supposedly anonymized release, Naranyanan and Shmatikov [19] were able to re-identify many individuals in the dataset by cross-referencing the reviews with publicly available reviews in the internet movie database. As a result of their work, a planned second Netflix challenge was canceled. The story need not have ended this way however -the formal privacy guarantee known as differential privacy could have prevented the attack of [19] , and indeed, McSherry and Mironov [17] demonstrated that many of the recommender systems proposed in the competition could have been implemented in a differentially private way.
In general, obtaining an accurate differentially private approximation of a given matrix is a difficult task. The default algorithm for this problem is input perturbation where each entry of the matrix is perturbed independently with, say, Gaussian noise of sufficient magnitude. This may however add an unacceptable level of noise. Unfortunately, it is not possible to improve on input perturbation methods for all matrices without violating blatant non privacy [7] . Can we improve over input perturbation on natural families of matrices?
In this paper, we answer this question in the affirmative by giving the first differentially private algorithms for approximating an input matrix with performance guarantees that are significantly better than input perturbation, under certain commonly satisfied conditions which are already assumed in prior work on non-private low rank matrix approximation. Our algorithms moreover guarantee that the output matrix has low-rank. The latter property is important for many applications in statistical analysis and data mining, with key applications including latent semantic indexing and principle component analysis. We provide theorems bounding the accuracy of our approximations as compared to the optimal low rank approximations in the Frobenius norm. The classical Eckart-Young theorem asserts that the optimal rank-k approximation of a matrix A (in either the Frobenius or Spectral norms) is obtained by computing the singular value decomposition A = U ΣV T , and releasing the truncated SVD A k = U Σ k V T , where in Σ k , all but the top k singular values have been zeroed out. Computing the SVD of a matrix takes time O(mn 2 ). In addition to offering privacy guarantees, our algorithm is also extremely efficient: it requires only elementary matrix operations and simple noisy perturbations, and for constant k takes time only O(mn). This represents a happy confluence of the two goals of privacy and efficiency. Normally, the two are at odds, and differentially private algorithms tend to be (much) less efficient than their non-private counterparts. In this case, however, we will see that some algorithms for fast approximate lowrank matrix approximation are much more amenable to a private implementation than their slower counterparts.
Computing low rank matrix approximations privately has been considered at least since [2] , and to date, no algorithm has improved over simple input perturbation, which achieves an error (when compared with the best rank k approximation A k ) in Frobenius norm of Θ( k(n + m)). Although this error is optimal without making any assumptions on the matrix, this error can be prohibitive when the best rank k approximation is actually very good: when A − A k F k(n + m). That is, exactly in the case when a low rank approximation to the matrix would be most useful. We give an algorithm which improves over input perturbation under the conditions that m n and that the coherence of the matrix is small: roughly, that no single row of the matrix is too significantly correlated with any of the right singular vectors of the matrix. Equivalently, no left singular vector has large correlation with one of the standard basis vectors. Low coherence is a commonly studied and satisfied condition. For example, Candes and Tao, motivated by the same Netflix Prize dataset re-identified by [19] , consider the problem of matrix completion under low coherence conditions [4] . They show that matrix completion is possible under low coherence assumptions, and that several reasonable random matrix models exhibit a strong incoherence property. Notably, [4] were not concerned with privacy at all: they viewed low coherence as a natural assumption satisfied for datasets resembling the Netflix prize data that could be leveraged to obtain stronger utility guarantees. This represents a second happy confluence of the goals of data privacy and utility: low coherence is an assumption that others already make free of privacy concerns in order to improve the state of the art in data analysis. We show that the same assumption can simultaneously be leveraged for data privacy. In retrospect, low coherence is also an extremely natural condition in the context of privacy, although one that has not previously been considered in the literature. If a matrix fails to have low coherence, then intuitively the data of individual rows of the matrix is encoded closely in individual singular vectors. If it does have low coherence, no small set of singular vectors can be used to encode any row of the matrix with high accuracy, and intuitively, low rank approximations reveal less local information about particular entries of the matrix.
The problem we solve is the following: Given a matrix A and a target rank k we privately compute and release a rank O(k) matrix B such that A − B F is not much larger than A − A k F , where A k is the optimal rank k approximation to A, and · F is the Frobenius norm. The quality of the approximation depends on several factors, including n, m, the desired rank k, and the coherence of the matrix. Our approach improves over input perturbation when the matrix coherence is small.
Our algorithm promises ( , δ)-differential privacy [8] with respect to changes of any single row of magnitude 1 in the 2-norm. Informally, this condition means that on any two matrices A, A such that A − A has a single nonzero row of Euclidean norm at most 1, our algorithm will have nearly indistinguishable output distributions. We defer the formal definition to Section 2. But note that this definition is only stronger than the standard notion of changing any single entry in the matrix by a unit amount. In the very special case of the matrix representing a (possibly unbalanced) graph, this captures (for example) the addition or removal of a single edge. Therefore in this case our algorithm is promising edge privacy rather than vertex privacy. From a privacy point of view, this is less desirable than vertex privacy, but is still a strong guarantee which is appropriate in many settings 1 . We note that edge privacy is well studied with respect to graph problems (see, e.g. [20, 11, 12] ), and that it corresponds to "full user level privacy" in any setting in which an individual's private data naturally corresponds to a pair of vertices in a graph (e.g. a hometown/employment pair).
Our results
We start with our first algorithm that improves over randomized response on matrices of small coherence. We say that an m × n matrix A has coherence C, if no row has Euclidean norm more than C · A F / √ m, i.e., more than C times the the typical row norm.This parameter varies between 1 and √ m, since no row can have Euclidean norm more than A F . Intuitively the condition says that no single row contributes too significantly to the Frobenius norm of the matrix.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal version of Theorem 6.2).
There is an ( , δ)-differentially private algorithm which given a matrix A ∈ R m×n of coherence C such that n ≥ m and given a parameter k computes a rank 2k matrix B such that 1 Even when vertices are the objects that naturally correspond to individuals, edge privacy still gives a non-trivial privacy guarantee. For example, consider a graph in which edges represent the existence of an email correspondence between two individuals. Large trends in this graph may be public knowledge (i.e. there will be many correspondences between individuals that attended the same school, work in the same company, etc.), whereas private data, such as the correspondences between a politician and his or her elicit lover, may manifest themselves as only small subsets of edges per person. Intuitively, edge privacy is a strong enough guarantee to hide the existence of as many as O(1/ ) affairs per politician.
with probability 9/10,
Moreover, the algorithm runs in time O(kmn).
Hidden in the O ,δ -notation is a factor of O(log(k/δ)/ ) that depends on the privacy parameters. Usually, δ 1/k so that log(k/δ) ≤ 2 log(1/δ). To understand the error bound note that the first term is proportional to the best possible approximation error A − A k F of any rank k approximation. In particular, this term is optimal up to constant factors. The second term expresses a more interesting phenomenon. Recall that we assume n m so that √ kn would usually dominate √ km except that the the √ kn term is multiplied by a factor which can be very small if the matrix has low coherence and is not too dense. For example,
) which can be as small as O(n 3/8 ) depending on the magnitude of m. However, already in a much wider range of parameters we observe an error of o( √ kn). In fact, in Section C we illustrate why the Netflix data satisfies the assumptions made here and why they are likely to hold in other recommender systems.
When A F ≥ √ n, the previous theorem cannot improve on randomized response by more than a factor of O(m 1/4 ). Our next theorem uses a stronger but standard notion of coherence known as µ0-coherence. We defer a formal definition of µ0-coherence to Section 5, but we remark that this parameter varies between 1 and m. Using this notion we are able to obtain improvements roughly of order O( √ m).
Theorem 1.2 (Informal version of Theorem 6.3). There is an ( , δ)-differentially private algorithm which given a matrix A ∈ R m×n with n ≥ m and of µ0-coherence µ and rank r ≥ 2k computes a rank 2k matrix B such that with probability 9/10,
Moreover, the algorithm runs in time O(kmn).
The hidden factor here is the same as before. Note that when µkr = polylog(n), the theorem can lead to an error boundÕ n 1/4 depending on the magnitude of m. Note that this is roughly the square root of what randomized response would give. But again under much milder assumptions on the coherence, the error remains o √ kn . Notably, Candes and Tao [4] work with a stronger incoherence assumption than what is needed here. Nevertheless they show that even their stronger assumption is satisfied in a number of reasonable random matrix models. A slight disadvantage of the error bound in Theorem 1.2 is that the actual rank r of the matrix enters the picture. Theorem 1.2 hence cannot improve over Theorem 1.1 when the matrix has very large rank. We do not know if the dependence on r in the above bound is inherent or rather an artifact of our analysis. Finally, we remark that while our result depends on the µ0-coherence of the input matrix, our algorithm does not require knowledge or estimation of the µ0-coherence of the input matrix. The only parameters provided to the algorithm are the target rank and the privacy parameters.
Reconstruction attacks and tightness of our results.
As it turns out, existing work on "blatant non-privacy" and reconstruction attacks [7] demonstrates that our results are essentially tight under the given assumptions. To draw this connection, let us first observe why input perturbation cannot be improved without any assumption on the matrix. To be more precise, by input perturbation we refer to the method which simply perturbs each entry of the matrix with independent Gaussian noise of magnitude O −1 log(1/δ) , which is sufficient to achieve ( , δ)differential privacy with respect to unit 2 perturbations of the entire matrix. To obtain a rank k approximation to the original matrix, one can then simply compute the exactly optimal rank k approximation to the perturbed matrix using the singular value decomposition, which as one can show introduces error O ,δ √ km + √ kn compared to the optimal rank k approximation to the original matrix in the Frobenius norm. First, let us observe that it is not possible in general to have an algorithm which guarantees error in the Frobenius norm of o( √ kn) for every matrix A, without violating blatant non-privacy 2 , as defined by [7] . This is because there is a simple reduction which starts with an ( , δ)-differentially private algorithm for computing rank k approximations to matrices A ∈ R m×n and gives an ( , δ)-differentially private algorithm which can be used to reconstruct almost every entry in any database D ∈ {0, 1} n for n = k · n. It is known that ( , δ)-private mechanisms do not admit such reconstruction attacks, and so the result is a lower bound. The reduction follows from the fact that we can always encode a bit-valued database D ∈ {0, 1} n for n = k · n as k rows of an m × n matrix for any m ≥ k, simply by zeroing out all additional m − k rows. Note that the resulting matrix only has rank k, and so the optimal rank k approximation to this matrix has zero error. If we could recover a matrix A such that A − A F = o( √ kn), this would mean that for a typical nonzero row Ai of the matrix with i ∈ [k], we would have Ai − A i 2 = o( √ n), and Ai − A i 1 ≤ o(n). Then, by simply rounding the entries, we could reconstruct the original database D in almost all of its entries, giving blatant non-privacy as defined by [7] .
What is happening in the above example? Intuitively, the problem is that in the rank k matrix we construct from D, the k nonzero rows of the matrix are encoded accurately by only k right singular vectors. On the other hand, low coherence implies that any k right singular vectors poorly represent a set of only k rows. Hence, there is hope to circumvent the above impediment using a low coherence assumption on the matrix. Indeed, this is precisely what Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 demonstrate. Nevertheless, reconstruction attacks still lead to lower bounds even under low coherence assumptions. Indeed, using the above ideas, the next proposition shows that Theorem 1.1 is essentially tight up to a factor of O( √ k). Since in many applications k = O(1), this discrepancy between our upper bound and the lower bound is often insignificant. Proposition 1.3. Any algorithm which given an m × n matrix A of coherence C outputs a rank k matrix B such that with high probability
cannot satisfy ( , δ)-differential privacy for sufficiently small constants , δ.
Proof (Sketch). For the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists such an algorithm M that satisfies ( , δ)differential privacy. Then consider a randomized algorithm M : {0, 1} n → R n which takes a data set D ∈ {0, 1} n containing a sensitive bit for n = kn individuals and encodes it as the m × n matrix AD which contains D in its first k rows and is 0 everywhere else. M (D) then computes M(AD) and outputs the projection of M(AD) onto the first k rows (thought of as a vector of length n = kn).
We claim that M is ( , δ)-differentially privacy. This is because the map from D to AD is sensitivity preserving and the post-processing computed on M (AD) preserves ( , δ)differential privacy of M.
On the other hand, we claim that M is blatantly nonprivate. To see this note that the matrix AD has coherence C = m/k and A F ≤ √ kn so that one can check that
But in this case we can compute a data set D from the output of M (D) such that D − D 0 = o(n ) by rounding. This is the definition of a reconstruction attack showing that M is blatantly non-private. Since ( , δ)-differential privacy is known to prevent blatant non-privacy 3 for sufficiently small , δ > 0, this presents the contradiction we sought.
A similar proof shows that error o( √ n · µ/m) (where µ is the µ0-coherence of the matrix) cannot be achieved with ( , δ)-differential privacy. This shows that also Theorem 1.2 is tight up to the exact dependence on k and r. We leave it as an intriguing open problem to determine the exact interplay between coherence and the other parameters.
Techniques and proof overview
Our algorithm is based on a random-projection algorithm of Halko, Martinsson and Tropp [13] , which involves two steps: range finding and projection. The range finding algorithm first computes k Gaussian measurements of A, which we denote by Y = AΩ. Here, A is m×n and Ω is n×k. These measurements can be thought of as a random projection of the matrix into a lower dimensional representation, i.e., Y is m × k. The crux of the analysis in [13] is in arguing that Y already captures most of the range of A. Hence, all that remains to be done is to compute the orthonormal projection operator PY into the span of Y, and to compute the projection PY A. Note that PY A is now a rank k approximation of A and since Y closely approximated the range of A, it must be a good approximation, say, in the Frobenius norm. 3 See, e.g., the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [6] .
The motivation of [13] was to obtain a fast low rank approximation algorithm. Indeed, [13] give a detailed theoretical analysis and empirical evaluation of the algorithm's performance.
Step 1: Privacy preserving range finder and projection.
We will leverage the algorithm of [13] to obtain improved accuracy bounds in the privacy setting. As a first step, we need to be able to carry out the range finding and projection step in a privacy preserving manner. Our analysis proceeds by observing that the projection of A to Y approximately preserves all of the 2 row-norms of A, and so we can apply a Gaussian perturbation to Y , rather than to A. (An m × k standard Gaussian matrix has Frobenius norm O( √ km), which is now independent of n). The formal presentation of this part of the argument appears in Section 4. This step provides an approximation to the range of A which might already be useful for some applications, but has not yet achieved our goal of computing a low rank approximation to A itself. For this, we need the projection step discussed next.
Step 2: Controlling the projection matrix using low coherence.
We then show that under our low-coherence assumption on A, the entries of the projection matrix into the range of Y , PY , must be small in magnitude. Finally, when PY has small entries, the final projection step, of computing PY A has low sensitivity, and although we must now again add a Gaussian perturbation of dimension m × n, the magnitude of the perturbation in each entry can be smaller than would have been necessary under naive input perturbation.
In order to obtain bounds on the ∞-norm of the projection operator we make crucial use of the low-coherence assumption. Here we describe the proof strategy that leads to Theorem 1.2. Theorem 1.1 is somewhat easier to show and follows along similar lines. The first observation is that the Gaussian measurements taken by the range finding algorithm are mostly linear combinations of the top left singular vectors of the matrix. But when the matrix A has low coherence, then its top left singular vectors must have very small correlation with the standard basis. This means that the top singular vectors must have small coordinates. As a result each of the Gaussian measurements we take must have small ∞-norm relative to the magnitude of the measurement. Some complications arise as we must add noise to the matrix Y for privacy reasons and then orthonormalize it using the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization algorithm. A key observation is that the noise matrix is generated independently of Y . As a result, it must be the case that all columns of the noise matrix have very small inner product with the columns of Y. A careful technical argument uses this observation in order to show that the effect of noise can be controlled throughout the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization. The result is a projection matrix in which the magnitude of each entry is small whenever the coherence of A was small to begin with.
The exact proof strategy depends on the notion of coherence that we work with. Both notions we consider in this paper are presented and analyzed in Section 5. We then also show that small µ0-coherence is indeed a stronger assumption than small C-coherence.
Related Work

Differential Privacy
We use as our privacy solution concept the by now standard notion of differential privacy, developed in a series of papers [2, 5, 8] , and first defined by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [8] . The problem of privately computing lowrank approximations to matrix valued data was one of the first problems studied in the differential privacy literature, first considered by Blum, Dwork, McSherry, and Nissim [2] , who give an input perturbation based algorithm for computing the singular value decomposition by directly computing the eigenvector decomposition of a perturbed covariance matrix. They note that the left singular values of an m × n matrix A can be computed with error depending only on m, by computing the m × m covariance matrix A · A T , perturbing each entry of this matrix with Gaussian noise scaled as O(m log(1/δ)/ ), and computing the eigenvalue decomposition of the resulting perturbed matrix. We note that this method does not improve on simple input perturbation for computing an approximation to the original matrix (or the full SVD), because for this, the right singular values must also be computed, and repeating this procedure on the n × n matrix A T ·A (which now has sensitivity Ω(n)) re-introduces the dependence on n. Indeed, as we show, no method can improve on input perturbation in general while remaining private: the only hope is to, as we do in this paper, improve for certain natural classes of matrixes. Computing SVDs and low rank approximations is an extremely useful primitive for differentially private algorithms, and indeed, McSherry and Mironov [17] used the algorithm given in [2] in order to implement and evaluate differentially private versions of recommendation algorithms from the Netflix prize competition.
Finding differentially private low-rank approximation algorithms with superior theoretical performance guarantees to input perturbation methods has remained an open problem. Beating input perturbation methods for arbitrary symmetric matrices was recently explicitly proposed as an open problem in [12] , who showed that such algorithms would lead to the first efficient algorithm for privately releasing synthetic data useful for graph cuts which improves over simple randomized response. Our work does not resolve this open question because our results only improve over input perturbation methods for matrices with unbalanced dimensions which satisfy a low-coherence assumption, but is the first algorithm to improve over [2] under any condition.
In a recent independent and simultaneous work, Kapralov, McSherry, and Talwar [14] give a new polynomial-time algorithm for computing privacy-preserving rank 1 approximations to symmetric, positive-semidefinite matrices. Their algorithm achieves ( , 0)-differential privacy under unit spectral norm perturbations to the matrix. Their algorithm outputs a vector v such that for all α > 0,
where · denotes the spectral norm) and they show that this is nearly tight for ( , 0)differential privacy guarantees. Our results are therefore strictly incomparable. In this work, the goal is to achieve error o( √ kn) (i.e. o( √ n) for rank-1 approximations) assuming low coherence, (a stronger error bound) under ( , δ)differential privacy (a weaker privacy guarantee) and without making any assumptions about symmetry or positivesemidefiniteness.
Fast Computation of Low Rank Matrix Approximations
There is also an extensive literature on randomized algorithms for computing approximately optimal low rank matrix approximations, motivated by improving the running time of the exact singular value decompositions. This literature originated with the work of Papadimitriou et al [21] and Frieze, Kannan, and Vempala [10] , who gave algorithms based on random projections and column sampling (in both cases with the goal of decreasing the dimension of the matrix). Achlioptas and McSherry [1] give fast algorithms for computing low rank approximations based on randomly perturbing the original matrix (which can be done to induce sparsity). Although [1] pre-dated the privacy literature, some of the algorithms presented in it can be viewed as privacy preserving, because perturbing the actual matrix with appropriately scaled Gaussian noise is a privacy preserving operation sometimes referred to as randomized response. When appropriately scaled (for privacy) Gaussian noise is added to an m × n matrix, it results in an algorithm for approximating the best rank k approximation up to an additive error of O( k(m + n)) in the Frobenius norm.
Our algorithms are most closely related to the very recent work of Halko, Martinsson, and Tropp [13] , who give fast algorithms for computing low rank approximations based on two steps: range finding, and projection. As already discussed, in the first step, these algorithms project the matrix A into an m × k matrix Y which approximately captures the range of A. Then A is projected into the range of Y , which yields a rank k matrix which gives a good approximation to A if a good rank-k approximation exists. We will further discuss the algorithm of [13] and our modifications in the course of the paper.
Low Coherence Conditions
Low coherence conditions have been recently studied in a number of papers for a number of matrix problems, and is a commonly satisfied condition on matrices. Recently, Candes and Recht [3] and Candes and Tao [4] considered the problem of matrix completion. Matrix completion is the problem of recovering all entries of a matrix from which only a subset of the entries which have been randomly sampled. This problem is inspired by the Netflix prize recommendation problem, in which a matrix is given, with individuals on the rows, movies on the columns, and in which the matrix entries correspond to individual movie ratings. The matrix provides only a small number of movie ratings per individual, and the challenge is to predict the missing entries in the matrix. Clearly accurate matrix completion is impossible for arbitrary matrices, but [3, 4] show the remarkable result that it is possible under low coherence assumptions. Candes and Tao [4] also show that almost every matrix satisfies a low coherence condition, in the sense that randomly generated matrices will be low coherence with extremely high probability.
Talwalkar and Rostamizadeh recently used low-coherence assumptions for the problem of (non-private) low-rank matrix approximation [22] . A common heuristic for speeding the computation of low-rank matrix approximations is to compute on only a small randomly chosen subset of the columns, rather than on the entire matrix. [22] showed that under low-coherence assumptions similar to those of [3, 4] , the spectrum of a matrix is in fact well approximated by a small number of randomly sampled columns, and give formal guarantees on the approximation quality of the sampling based Nyström method of low-rank matrix approximation.
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PRELIMINARIES
We view our dataset as a real valued matrix A ∈ R m×n . We sometimes denote the i-th row of a matrix by A (i) . We define N as the set of all matrices that take 0 at all values, except possibly in a single row, which has Euclidean norm at most 1. Formally, N contains all matrices P ∈ R m×n for which there exists an index i ∈ [m] such that P (i) 2 ≤ 1 and P (j) 2 = 0 for all j = i.
We use the by now standard privacy solution concept of differential privacy:
vate if for all pairs of neighboring databases A, A ∈ R m×n , and for all subsets of the range S ⊆ R:
We make use of the following useful facts about differential privacy. The following useful theorem of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan tells us how differential privacy guarantees compose. Theorem 2.4 (Composition [9] ). Let , δ ∈ (0, 1), δ > 0. If M1, . . . , M k are each ( , δ)differentially private algorithms, then the algorithm M (A) ≡ (M1(A), . . . , M k (A)) releasing the concatenation of the results of each algorithm is (k , kδ)-differentially private. It is also ( , kδ + δ )-differentially private for:
We denote the 1-dimensional Gaussian distribution of mean µ and variance σ 2 by N (µ, σ 2 ). We use N (µ, σ 2 ) d to denote the distribution over d-dimensional vectors with i.i.d. coordinates sampled from N (µ, σ 2 ). We write X ∼ D to indicate that a variable X is distributed according to a distribution D. We note the following useful fact about the Gaussian distribution.
The following theorem is well known folklore. We include a proof in Section A for completeness.
Theorem 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism). Let > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Let u, v ∈ R d be any two vectors such that u − v 2 ≤ c. Put σ = 4c −1 log(2/δ). Then, for every measurable set A ⊆ R d and g ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) d , we have
Vector and matrix norms.
We denote by · p the p-norm of a vector and sometimes use · as a shorthand for the Euclidean norm. Given a real m × n matrix A, we will work with the spectral norm A 2 and the Frobenius norm A F defined as
For a matrix Y we denote by PY the orthonormal projection operator onto the range of Y. 
LOW-RANK APPROXIMATION VIA GAUSSIAN MEASUREMENTS
We will begin by presenting an algorithm of Halko, Martinsson and Tropp [13] as described in Figure 1 . The algorithm produces a rank r + p approximation that already for p ≥ 2 closely matches the best rank r approximaton of the matrix in Frobenius norm. The guarantees of the algorithm are detailed in Theorem 3.1.
Input: Matrix A ∈ R m×n , target rank r, oversampling parameter p.
Range finder:
Let Ω be an n×k standard Gaussian matrix where k = p + r. Compute the n × k measurement matrix Y = AΩ. Compute the orthonormal projection operator PY .
Projection: Compute the projection B = PY A.
Output: Matrix B of rank k. 
In particular, for p = r + 1 we have
When applying the the theorem we will use Markov's inequality to argue that the error bounds hold with sufficiently high probability up to a constant factor loss. As shown in [13] , much better bounds on the failure probability are possible. We will omit the precise bounds here for the sake of simplicity.
PRIVACY-PRESERVING SUB-ROUTINES: RANGE FINDER AND PROJECTION
In order to give a privacy preserving variant of the above algorithm, we will first need to carefully bound the sensitivity of the range finder and of the projection step, and bound the effect of the necessary perturbations. We do this for each step in this section.
Privacy-preserving range finder
In this section we present a privacy-preserving algorithm which finds a set of vectors Y whose span contains most of the spectrum of a given matrix A.
Input: Matrix A ∈ R m×n , target rank r, oversampling parameter p such that r + p ≤ min{m, n}, privacy parameters , δ ∈ (0, 1/2).
1.
Let Ω be an n × k standard Gaussian matrix where k = p + r.
2. Compute the n × k measurement matrix Y = AΩ.
Let N
∼ N (0, ρ 2 ) m×k where ρ = 2 −1 2k log (4k/δ). 4. LetỸ = Y + N.
Orthonormalize the columns ofỸ and let the result be W.
Output: Orthonormal m × k matrix W. Figure 2 satisfies ( , δ)differential privacy.
Proof. We argue that outputtingỸ preserves ( , δ)differential privacy. That outputting W preserves ( , δ)differential privacy follows from the fact that differential privacy holds under arbitrary post-processing.
Consider any two neighboring matrices A, A ∈ R m×n differing in their i'th row, and let Y = AΩ and Y = A Ω. Define e ∈ R n to be e T = A (i) − A (i) . Note that by the definition of neighboring, we must have e 2 ≤ 1. Observe that for each row j = i, we have Y (j) = Y (j) , and defineê ∈ R k to beê = Y (i) − Y (i) = e T Ω. First, we will give a high-probability bound on ê 2. Observe that for each j ∈ [k],êj is distributed like a standard Gaussian:
where we used Fact 2.5. Therefore, we have for any t ≥ 1, by standard Gaussian tail bounds,
Taking a union bound over all k coordinates we have:
In particular, we have except with probability δ/2,
Note that we have set ρ such that conditioned on Equation 4 (which holds with probability at least 1 − δ/2) we have the following by Theorem 2.6: For every set S ⊆ R m×k , Pr Ỹ ∈ S ≤ exp( ) Pr Ỹ ∈ S + δ/2. Hence, without any conditioning we can say:
which completes the proof of privacy.
Theorem 4.2. Let A be an m × n matrix with singular values σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ . . . . Then, given A and valid parameters r, p, , δ, the algorithm in Figure 2 returns a matrix W such that W satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy, and moreover we have the error bound
Proof. Privacy follows from Lemma 4.1. Let us therefore argue the second part of the theorem. Consider the m × (n + m) matrix
where Im×m is the m × m identity matrix. Let Ω denote a random (m + n) × k Gaussian matrix. Note that
That is,Ỹ is distributed the same way as Y = A Ω . Here, we're using the fact that ρN (0, 1) = N (0, ρ 2 ).
On the other hand, by Theorem 3.1, we know that Y is a good range for A in the sense that
Here, σ j denotes the j-th largest singular value of A .
The claim is immediate, because we can obtain A from A by truncating the last m columns. Hence, the approximation error can only decrease. Proof. Consider the matrix A0 = [A | 0m×m] where 0m×m is the all zeros matrix. Note that
Also, σj = σj(A0), since we just appended an all zeros matrix. On the other hand,
Hence, by Weyl's perturbation bound (Theorem 2.9)
Combining the previous claims with (6), we have
Since Y andỸ are identically distributed, the same claim is true when replacing P Y by PỸ . Furthermore, PỸ = W W T and so the claim follows.
Corollary 4.5. Let A ∈ R m×n be as in the previous theorem. Assume that m ≤ n and run the algorithm with p ≥ r + 1. Then, with probability 99/100,
Proof. By Markov's inequality and the previous theorem, we have with probability 99/100,
But note that (σj + ρ) 2 = σ 2 j + 2σjρ + ρ 2 ≤ 3σ 2 j + 3ρ 2 . This is because either σj > ρ ≥ 1 and thus σ 2 j ≥ σjρ or else ρ ≥ σ in which case ρ 2 ≥ σjρ. The claim follows by using that
Privacy-preserving projections
In the previous section we showed a privacy-preserving algorithm that finds a small number of orthonormal vectors W such that A is well-approximated by W W T A. To obtain a privacy preserving low-rank approximation algorithm we still need to show how to carry out the projection step in a privacy-preserving fashion. We analyze the error of the projection step in terms of the magnitude of the maximum entry of each column of W. This serves to bound the sensitivity of the matrix multiplication operation. The smaller the entries of W, the smaller the over all error that we incur.
Lemma 4.6. The output B of the algorithm satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. We will argue that releasing W T A + N preserves ( , δ)-differential privacy. That releasing B preserves differential privacy follows from the fact that differential privacy does not degrade under arbitrary post-processing. Fix any two neighboring matrices A, A differing in their i'th row.
Input: Matrix A ∈ R m×n , matrix W ∈ R m×k whose columns have norm at most 1, privacy parameters , δ ∈ (0, 1/2).
1. Let W = [w1 | w2 | · · · | w k ] and for each i ∈ [k] let αi = wi ∞ denote the maximum magnitude entry in wi.
2. Let N be a random k × n matrix where Nij ∼ N (0, α 2 i ρ 2 ) for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [n] and ρ = 2 −1 8k ln(4k/δ) ln(2/δ).
Compute the matrix
,j · e 2 ≤ αj e 2 = αj .
Hence, by Theorem 2.6, releasing (
, δ 2k )-differential privacy. Finally, we apply Theorem 2.4 to see that releasing each of the k rows of W T E preserves ( , k(δ/2k) + δ/2) = ( , δ)differential privacy for:
Theorem 4.7. The algorithm above returns a matrix B such that B satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy and moreover with probability 99/100,
In particular if maxi αi = α, we have with the same probability,
Proof.
On the other hand, by Jensen's inequality and linearity of expectation,
The claim now follows from Markov's inequality.
Note that the quantities αi are always bounded by 1, since all wi's are unit vectors. In the next section, we will show that under certain incoherence assumptions, we will have (or will be able to enforce) the condition that the αi values are bounded significantly below 1.
INCOHERENT MATRICES
Intuitively speaking, a matrix is incoherent if its left singular vectors have low correlation with the standard basis vectors. There are multiple ways to formalize this intuition.
Here, we will work with two natural notions of coherence. In both cases we will be able to show that we can find-in a privacy-preserving way-projection operators that have small entries. As demonstrated in the previous section, this directly leads to improvements over randomized response.
C-coherent matrices
In this section we work with matrices A in which row norms do not deviate by too much from the typical row norm. Another way to look at this condition is that coordinate projections provide little spectral information about the matrix A. From this angle the condition we need can be interpreted as low coherence in the sense that the singular vectors of A that correspond to large singular values must be far from the standard basis.
Definition 5.1 (C-coherence). We say that a ma-
Note that we have 1 ≤ C ≤ √ m.
The next lemma shows that sparse vectors have poor correlation with the matrix in the above sense. We say a vector w is -sparse if it has at most nonzero coordinates.
Lemma 5.2. Let A ∈ R m×n be a C-coherent matrix. Let w be an -sparse unit vector in R m . Then,
Proof. Since w is -sparse we can write it as w = i=1 αiei where e1, . . . , e are distinct standard basis vectors and i α 2 i = 1. Hence,
In the last step we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that A is C-coherent.
Lemma 5.3. Let α > 0. Let A ∈ R m×n be a C-coherent matrix. Let w ∈ R m be a unit vector and suppose wα is the vector obtained from w by zeroing all coordinates greater than α. Then,
Proof. Note that w − wα is an -sparse vector with ≤ 1/α 2 . Here we used that w is a unit vector and hence there can be at most 1/α 2 coordinates larger than α. The lemma now follows directly from Lemma 5.2.
The next lemma is a straightforward extension of the previous one for the case where we multiply A by a matrix W rather than a single vector.
Lemma 5.4. Let α > 0. Let A ∈ R m×n be a C-coherent matrix. Let W ∈ R m×k be a matrix whose columns have unit length. Suppose Wα is the matrix obtained from W by zeroing all entries greater than α. Then,
Proof. By the previous lemma, we have
The lemma follows.
The previous lemma quantifies what happens if we replace
Working with W T α for small α instead of W T will decrease the sensitivity of the computation of W T α A. On the other hand, by the previous lemma we have an expression for the error resulting from the truncation step.
Strong coherence
Here we introduce and work with the notion of µ0coherence which is a standard notion of coherence. As we will see in Section 5.3, it is a stronger notion than Ccoherence. Consequently, the results we will be able to obtain using µ0-coherence are stronger than our previous results on C-coherence in certain aspects.
Definition 5.5 (µ0-coherence). Let U be an m × r matrix with orthonormal columns and r ≤ n. Recall, that PU = U U T . The µ0-coherence of U is defined as
Here, ej denotes the j-th m-dimensional standard basis vector and U (j) denotes the j-th row of U.
The µ0-coherence of an m × n matrix A of rank r given in its singular value decomposition U ΣV T where U ∈ R m×r is defined as µ0(U ). Proof. Since U is orthonormal, there must always exists a row of square norm r/m. On the other hand, no row of U has squared norm larger than r.
The above notion is used extensively throughout the literature in the context of matrix completion and low rank approximation, e.g., in Candes and Recht [3] , Keshavan et al. [15] , Talwalkar and Rostamizadeh [22] , Mohri and Talwalkar [18] . Motivated by the Netflix problem, Candes and Tao [4] study matrix completion for matrices satisfying a stronger incoherence assumption than small µ0-coherence.
Our goal from here on is to show that if we run our range finding algorithm from Section 4.1 on a low-coherence matrix it will produce a projection matrix with small entries. This result (presented in Lemma 5.11) requires several technical lemmas.
The first technical step is a lemma showing that vectors that lie in the range of an incoherent matrix must have small ∞-norm.
Lemma 5.7. Let U be an orthonormal m×r matrix. Suppose w ∈ range(U ) and w = 1. Then,
Proof. Let u1, . . . , ur denote the columns of U. By our set of assumptions, there exist α1, . . . , αr ∈ R such that
Therefore, denoting the j-th entry of w by wj and the j-th entry of ui by uij, we have
In particular w 2
On the other hand, using Definition 5.5,
We will need the following geometric lemma: If we start with a small orthonormal set of vectors of low coherence and we append few random unit vectors, then the span of the resulting set of vectors has a low coherence basis.
Lemma 5.8. Let u1, . . . , ur ∈ R m be orthonormal vectors. Pick unit vectors n1, . . . , n k ∈ S m−1 uniformly at random. Assume that
where c0 is a sufficiently large constant. Then, there exists a set of orthonormal vectors v1, . . . , v r+k ∈ R m such that span{v1, . . . , v r+k } = span{u1, . . . , ur, n1, . . . , n k } and furthermore, with probability 99/100,
Proof. We will construct the basis iteratively using the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization algorithm starting with the partial orthonormal basis u1, . . . , ur. The algorithm works as follows: At iteration i we have obtained a partial orthonormal basis v1, . . . , vt where t = r+i−1. We then pick a random unit vector v ∈ S m−1 and let v =
Let Vt = [v1 | · · · | vt] and Vt+1 = [Vt | vt+1]. Our goal is to bound vt+1 2 ∞ as this will directly lead to a bound on µ0(Vt+1) in terms of Vt. Summing up this bound over t will lead to a bound on µ0(V r+k ) which is what the lemma is asking for.
Let us start with a two simple claims that follow from measure concentration on the sphere. The first one bounds the ∞-norm of a random unit vector. 
Taking a union bound over all i ∈ [t] we have with proba-
where we used that t ≤ r + k.
On the one hand, note that v is in the span of v1, . . . , vt by definition. Hence, Lemma 5.7 directly implies that
Hence, combining Equation 9 with Claim 5.10, we have with
On the other hand, we can bound vt+1 2 ∞ as follows:
By Claim 5.10 we have that with probability
In the first inequality above we used that v, v = t i=1 vi, v 2 = v 2 . We then applied Claim 5.10 in the second inequality. By Equation 8 , m is sufficiently large so that
Combining Equation 10 with Equation 11 and applying Claim 5.9, we conclude that with with probability at least
But when the above bound on vt+1 2 ∞ holds, then we must have
Taking a union bound over all k steps, we find that with probability 99/100, Equation 12 is true at all steps of the Gram-Schmidt algorithm. Assuming that this event occurs, we have: The choice of failure probability in the previous lemma was rather arbitrary and stronger bounds can be achieved. We finally arrive at the main lemma in this section.
Lemma 5.11. Let A be an m×n matrix of rank r. Let Ω ∼ N (0, 1) n×k with k ≤ r denote a random standard Gaussian matrix and define Y = AΩ. Assume that m ≥ c0kr log r for sufficiently large constant c0. Further, let σ > 0 and N ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) m×k denote a random Gaussian matrix with i.i.d. entries sampled from N (0, σ 2 ). PutỸ = AΩ + N and let w1, . . . , w k be an orthonormal basis for the range ofỸ . Then, with probability 99/100,
Proof. Let U denote the left singular factor of A. Let u1, . . . , ur denote the columns of U. We have, span({w1, . . . , w k }) = range(Ỹ ), since w1, . . . , w k is an orthonormal basis for the range ofỸ by construction. On the other hand, range(Y ) ⊆ range(A) = span({u1, . . . , ur}) . SinceỸ = Y + N this implies that range(Ỹ ) ⊆ span{u1, . . . , ur, n1, . . . n k } , where n1, . . . , n k are the columns of N normalized such that ni = 1. By assumption m is large enough so that we can apply Lemma 5.8. Thus we obtain orthonormal vectors v1, . . . , v r+k satisfying range(Ỹ ) ⊆ span{v1, . . . , v r+k } and the matrix V whose columns are v1, . . . , v r+k has coherence 
Since k ≤ r and µ0(A) = µ0(U ), we conclude that
Remark 5.12. We remark that the previous lemma is essentially tight. Indeed, under the given assumption on A there could be a left singular vector of ∞-norm rµ0(A)/m. The above lemma implies that we are never more than a O( √ log m)-factor away from this bound.
Relation between C-coherence and µ0coherence
Here we show that the assumption of small µ0-coherence is strictly stronger than that of small C-coherence assuming the rank of the matrix is not too large.
Lemma 5.13. Let A be an m × n matrix of rank r. Then,
Proof. Let the SVD of A be U ΣV T and denote the right singular vectors by v1, . . . , vr. Extend them arbitrarily to an orthonormal basis of R n , denoted v1, . . . , vn. We then have for every j ∈ [m],
where we used that the 2 2 -norm of a vector is bounded by the 2 1 -norm. On the other hand, 
Taking square roots on both sides and rearranging, we find
Note that the left hand side is exactly the smallest C for which A is C-coherent. This proves the lemma.
Recall that Lemma 5.2 showed that the singular vectors corresponding to large singular values of a C-coherent matrix A cannot be too sparse. In particular, the top singular vectors must have small µ0-coherence as a result. However, we cannot rule out that there are singular vectors corresponding to small singular values that do have large coordinates.
PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOW RANK APPROXIMATIONS
In this section we compose the range finder, projection and truncation step to get a private low rank approximation algorithm suitable for matrices of low coherence.
Input: Matrix A ∈ R m×n , target rank r ≥ 2, oversampling parameter p ≥ 2, pruning parameter α > 0, privacy parameters , δ ∈ (0, 1/2).
Range finder: Run the range finder (Figure 2) on
A with sampling parameter k = p+r and privacy parameters ( /2, δ/2). Let the output be denoted by W.
2.
Pruning: Let W be the matrix obtained from W by zeroing out all entries larger than α.
3. Projection: Run the projection algorithm (Figure 3 ) on input A, W and privacy parameters ( /2, δ/2). Let B denote the output of the projection algorithm.
Output: Matrix B of rank k = (r + p). Proof. This follows directly from composition and the privacy guarantee achieved by the subroutines.
The next theorem details the performance of PFP on Ccoherent matrices. In particular, it shows that in a natural range of parameters it improves significantly over randomized response (input perturbation).
Theorem 6.2 (Case of C-coherent matrices).
There is an ( , δ)-differentially private algorithm that given a C-coherent matrix A ∈ R m×n and parameters r ≥ 2, p ≥ 2 produces a rank k = r +p matrix B such that with probability 9/10, 
In particular, the second error term is o kn log(k/δ)/ , whenever m = o(n)
and
We generally think of C, k as small compared to both m and n. Equation 15 states that the algorithm outperforms randomized response whenever m is not too large compared to n and not too small compared to the rank k, the Frobenius norm of A divided by √ n, and the coherence parameter C. These two conditions are naturally satisfied for a wide range of parameters. For example, when A F = O( √ kn) (so that randomized response no longer provides non-trivial error) and C = O(1) (i.e., the matrix is very incoherent), then the requirement on m is just that
The proof of Theorem 6.2 is a straightforward combination of our previous error bounds for range finding, pruning and projection.
Proof Proof of Theorem 6.2. We run PFP with the given set of parameters r, p, , δ and a suitable choice of the pruning parameter α > 0. Before fixing α, we claim that the error of the algorithm satisfies, with probability 9/10,
Here, the first term follows from Theorem 3.1 and an application of Markov's inequality to argue that the bound holds except with sufficiently small constant probability. The other terms follow from Theorem 4.7 (error bound of the projection algorithm), Corollary 4.5 (error bound of the range finder), and, Lemma 5.4 (error bound for the pruning step with parameter α). We can now optimize α so as to achieve the geometric mean between the two terms that it appears in (as α and 1/α). Running PFP with this choice of α directly results in the error bound stated in Equation 14 . Equation 15 is now easily verified by equating the O(·)-term in Equation 14 with o( kn log(k/δ)/ ) and rearranging. Since all sub-routines fail with probability at most 1/100, we can take a union bound to conclude that the algorithm fails to satisfy the error bound with probability at most 1/10. We will next analyze the performance of PFP on µ0incoherent matrices. In this case no truncation is necessary, since we argued that the projection matrix with high probability already has very small entries. The error bound here is stronger in certain aspects as we will discuss in a moment. Theorem 6.3 (Case of µ0-coherent matrices). There is an ( , δ)-differentially private algorithm that given a rank R matrix A ∈ R m×n and parameters r ≥ 2, p ≥ 2 such that k = r + p ≤ R and m ≥ ω(Rk log R) produces a rank k matrix B such that with probability 9/10,
In particular, the error is o kn log(k/δ)/ , whenever m = o(n) and Rk(µ0(A)+log m) log(k/δ) = o(m) .
Just as in the previous theorem we get a range for m in which the algorithm improves over randomized response. Here, we need the coherence of A to be small compared to m. We also observe a dependence on the rank of the matrix. This means the algorithm presents no improvement if the matrix is close to being full rank. Recall that µ0(A) can be as small as O(1). In particular, in the natural case where µ0(A), k, R all are small compared to m, e.g., m 0.3 , the requirement in Equation 17 reduces to m = o(n).
Note that Theorem 6.3 is quantitatively stronger than Theorem 6.2 in the following regime: When k, R, C, µ0(A) are all small (e.g., n o(1) ), m ≤ √ n and A 2 F ≥ n, then Theorem 6.3 improves over randomized response by a factor of roughly √ m, whereas Theorem 6.2 achieves an m 1/4 -factor improvement.
Proof Proof of Theorem 6.3. We run PFP with the given set of parameters r, p, , δ and α = 1. Note that this choice of α implies that we never modify the matrix returned by the range finder. We claim that the error of the algorithm is with probability 9/10,
which is what we stated in the theorem. The first error term follows as before from Theorem 3.1 and Markov's inequality so that it holds with probability 99/100. The term of O( km log(k/δ)/ ) follows from Corollary 4.5. To understand the remaining terms that by Lemma 5.11 we have that the matrix W = [w1 | · · · | w k ] returned by the range finder satisfies with probability 99/100,
In applying Lemma 5.11 we needed that m ≥ c0kR log R for sufficiently large constant which is satisfied by our assumption. Hence, Theorem 4.7 ensures that the error resulting from the projection operation is at most O(αk n log(k/δ)/ ). Expanding α in the latter bound gives the stated error term. Equation 15 is now easily verified by equating the O(·)-term in Equation 16 with o( kn log(k/δ)/ ) and rearranging. Again, we can take a union bound over the failure probabilities of the sub-routines to bound the probability that our algorithm fails to satisfy the stated bound by 1/10.
